Long-Range Rocket Artillery and Cambodia’s Asymmetric Counteroffensive Strategy

 **Long-Range Rocket Artillery and Cambodia’s Asymmetric Counteroffensive Strategy

in the Border Conflict with Thailand**

Author: Le Hai

Date of completion: December 17, 2025

Executive Summary

In the context of sustained attacks from Thailand, Cambodia has unexpectedly shifted from a defensive posture to an asymmetric counteroffensive using long-range multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), most notably the BM-21 and RM-70. This shift is not a spontaneous reaction, but a calculated military strategy closely tied to regional power structures—particularly China’s indirect structural backing and the intensifying competition for influence in Southeast Asia involving Japan.

1. Battlefield evidence: confirmation of long-range rocket artillery use

According to military reports released by Thai authorities, Cambodia has:

Deployed BM-21 multiple launch rocket systems against border areas in the Thai provinces of Buriram, Surin, Sisaket, and Ubon Ratchathani.

Coordinated BM-21 fire with other rocket-based fire-support systems and conventional artillery, producing high-density saturation strikes.

Employed BM-21 and RM-70 systems against key positions such as Ta Khwai, Phu Ma Khuea, and multiple sites along the border.

📌 From a technical standpoint, BM-21 and RM-70 are MLRS platforms designed to deliver area-effect firepower and generate substantial psychological pressure, despite lower tactical precision compared to guided munitions.

2. Why rocket artillery? The logic of asymmetric warfare

2.1. Structural imbalance of power

Cambodia lacks air superiority, while Thailand possesses superior airpower, ISR capabilities, and precision-strike capacity. Direct confrontation would therefore impose disproportionate costs on Cambodian forces—an outcome well documented in contemporary asymmetric warfare models.

2.2. MLRS as a tool of advantage denial

Studies by the RAND Corporation and the International Institute for Strategic Studies identify MLRS as a preferred tool for weaker actors seeking to:

Disrupt the opponent’s operational tempo,

Force dispersion of superior forces,

Maintain sustained pressure on tactical rear areas.

Cambodia thus pursues advantage denial rather than decisive victory, aiming to neutralize Thailand’s military superiority rather than defeat it outright.

3. The “absorb pressure – strike unexpectedly” strategy

Cambodia’s operational pattern—

accepting initial fire pressure,

delaying retaliation,

launching sudden MLRS strikes once the opponent assumes battlefield control—

aligns with the concept of controlled escalation, as described by the Center for Strategic and International Studies: limited escalation designed to secure political and strategic leverage without crossing the threshold into full-scale war.

4. China: structural backing without direct intervention

According to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Cambodia relies heavily on Chinese and legacy Soviet-origin weapons ecosystems, particularly in artillery and MLRS.

This structure enables Cambodia to:

Sustain deterrence at relatively low cost,

Avoid the transfer of sensitive or escalatory technologies,

Fit within China’s “sufficient but indirect support” strategy in Southeast Asia.

👉 China thus shapes capability structures, rather than directly managing the conflict.

5. Japan and the competition for influence in ASEAN

Analyses by the Japan Institute of International Affairs indicate that Japan has expanded:

security and defense-industrial cooperation,

strategic infrastructure investments,

“soft” defense partnerships with Thailand.

Within this context, Cambodia’s MLRS counteroffensive carries geopolitical signaling value, directed not only at Thailand but at the broader China-containment axis within ASEAN.

6. The academic nature of the conflict

Using the analytical framework of the International Crisis Group, the Thailand–Cambodia conflict displays the following characteristics:

Low-intensity warfare,

Controlled escalation,

No immediate objective of border redefinition.

Cambodia does not require victory—it requires avoiding strategic subjugation.

Strategic Conclusions

✔ Long-range rocket artillery represents a rational strategic choice for a militarily weaker actor

✔ China acts as a structural patron, not a direct belligerent

✔ Japan functions as a soft-power counterweight aligned with Thailand

✔ The region is entering a condition of:

managed conflict without resolution

Selected References

SIPRI – Arms Transfers Database; Military Expenditure Reports

International Institute for Strategic Studies – The Military Balance

RAND Corporation – Asymmetric Warfare & Escalation Control Studies

Center for Strategic and International Studies – Southeast Asia Security & Defense Analysis

Japan Institute of International Affairs – ASEAN–Japan Strategic Outlook

International Crisis Group – Border Conflict & Low-Intensity Warfare Reports